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Abstract
A key part of decentralized consensus protocols is a procedure for random selection, which is
the source of the majority of miners cost and wasteful energy consumption in Bitcoin. We provide
a simple economic model for random selection mechanism and show that any PoW protocol with
natural desirable properties is outcome equivalent to the random selection mechanism used in
Bitcoin.




A key part of decentralized consensus protocols is a procedure for random selection. In Bitcoin
(Nakamoto, 2008), the ledger is periodically update by a randomly selected server in network. In
fact, the random selection is so central to the Bitcoin protocol that the servers that maintain Bitcoin
are called miners because a server who updates the ledger is said to have “mined a block” (a block
is a batch of transaction data).
One of Bitcoin’s central innovations is a method for verifiably selecting a random miner in a
decentralized manner. This entrails two central restrictions: (i) the system cannot rely on a trusted
randomization device, and (ii) any computer can join the network, implying that miner are not
identifiable. The random selection is achieved through the use of cryptography as follows: Each
miner assembles a block of transaction data, which includes a free-set field called nonce. The block
can be added to the ledger if applying a cryptographic hash function to the block yields a value
that is below a difficulty threshold. A miner that finds such a block is said to have mined a block.
Miners are rewarded financially when mining a block, and therefore compete to mine blocks.
Under the assumption that the cryptographic hash function is irreversible, each selection of a
nonce yields a mined block with a fixed probability. A miner’s probability of mining the next block
is proportional to the number of nonces attempted. Since each attempt requires calculation of the
hash function, the number of attempts is in turn proportional to the miner’s share of the total
computational power of the Bitcoin network. The difficulty threshold adjusts to keep the overall
average block mining rate constant. Bitcoin and similar systems are often called called Proof-of-
Work (PoW) protocols, as each miner increases his probability of being selected by executing costly
computations.
Bitcoin’s PoW protocol have been successful in establishing a reliable system, but there has
been much interest in replacing it. One reason is the high monetary and environmental cost of
wasteful computation. The work done by miners serves no purpose other than providing a random
selection. As the popularity and value of Bitcoin increased, more miners compete for the rewards.
Currently the total electricity used by miners exceeds that of some small countries, and the majority
of this consumption is spent on computing the hash in attempt to mine a block.
This note analyzes random selection as a game theoretic problem. This allows us to abstract
away from the particular protocol used in Bitcoin and consider general proof-of-work protocols.
We define three desirable properties of PoW protocols: anonymity, robustness to Sybil attacks
and robustness to merging. Anonymity states that the protocol discriminates between miners only
based on the computations they performed. Robustness to Sybil attacks ensures that it is never
beneficial for a miner to pretend to be a number of different miners. Robustness to merger states
that no group of miners can increase their joint probability of mining a block by joining forces and
becoming a single miner without performing more computations.
Our main result shows that any PoW protocol with these properties is outcome equivalent to
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the random selection used in Bitcoin. More precisely, each miner is selected with a probability
that is proportional to the number of computations she performed. This result is driven only by
game-theoretic constraints and not by constraints on computations underlying the protocol. Thus,
in order to improve upon the Bitcoin PoW mechanism it is necessary to use a different form of
decentralization that violates on of the properties we introduced.
The result has drastic implications for the design of decentralized cryptocurrencies and the
plethora of alternative blockchain protocols that propose different cryptographic methods to im-
prove on the PoW mechanism of Bitcoin.1 Such improvements cannot be obtained only from a
change in the cryptographic method while maintaining anonymity, robustness to Sybil attacks and
merging. In order for alternatives such as Proof-of-Stake to provide better performance these must
be able to identify miners (violate anonymity), or restrict the entry of unidentified miners (which
allows the protocol to violate robustness to Sybil attacks), or provide the miners with incentives to
merge and therefore limit the decentralization of the system.
This note is structured as follows: Section 2 defines a random selection mechanisms based
on investment levels (i.e. the number of computations performed by each miner) and provides a
characterization of all random selection mechanisms that are anonymous and robust to Sybil attakcs
and merging. Section 3 makes the connection between random selection based on computational
tasks and our definition of random selection mechanisms. We conclude in Section 4 and comment
on how Proof-of-Stake can allow other forms of random selection by violating our axioms.
2 Random Selection Mechanisms
Denote by ∆n a random selection from the set of n agents ∆n =
{
z ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
i=1 zi = 1
}
. We
furthermore denote by N = {1, . . . , n} the set of agents and by i a typical agent. We begin by
introducing the main object of interest in our study – the random selection mechanism:
Definition 1 (Random Selection Mechanism). A random selection mechanism p is described by
a family of functions pn : Rn+ → ∆n indexed by n ∈ N such that the probability with which agent
i ∈ N is selected at the investment profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) equals
pni (x1, . . . , xn),
which is non-decreasing in xi.
In the context of Bitcoin, random selection is achieved by picking the agent who is first able to
produce a block with a sufficiently low hash value. The number of costly computations xi agent i
is willing to invest in mining this block is mapped to a probability of being the first to compute
1As of February 2019, Wikipedia lists more than 20 different PoW cryptocurrencies, see table in https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof-of-work_system.
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such a hash and thus being selected. We will explain in Section 3 in greater detail how block
mining in Bitcoin and other proof of work based crypto-currencies are a special case of a random
selection mechanism. Conceptually, the abstraction to selection mechanisms is useful as it allows
us to analyze the implication of economic constraints on decentralized systems like Bitcoin without
the need to model the cryptographic and computational details.
The first constraint we impose is anonymity. It states that every agent is treated the same by the
mechanism, i.e. if two agents exchange their identities they are still treated the same. For example
in the Bitcoin protocol all miners are treated the same, i.e. they all face the same requirement to
be selected to mine the next block.
Axiom 1 (Anonymity). A selection mechanism is anonymous if it is invariant under permutations,
i.e. for every n and every permutation π : Rn+ → Rn+ it satisfies π(pn(x)) = pn(π(x)).
For notational simplicity we will state our other axioms for anonymous mechanisms.
Axiom 2 (Robustness to Sybil Attacks). An anonymous random selection mechanism is robust to
Sybil attacks if for every x ∈ Rn+ and every y ∈ Rk+ with
∑k
j=1 yj = x1
pn1
(







y1, . . . , yk, x2, x3, . . . , xn
)
.
Thus, robustness to Sybil attacks states that the selection probability of agent 1 in a situation
with n agents is weakly less than the sum of the selection probabilities of agent 1 and 2 in an n+ 1
agent situation where agent 1’s total investments are split between the first two agents. Intuitively,
this restriction ensures that no agent can pretend to be a group of different agents and increase his
winning probability without investing more.
Axiom 3 (Robust to Centralization). An anonymous random selection mechanism is robust to
centralization if for every x ∈ Rn+ and every y ∈ Rk+ with
∑k
j=1 yj = x1
pn1
(







y1, . . . , yk, x2, x3, . . . , xn
)
.
Robustness to centralization imposes the complementary requirement to robustness to Sybil at-
tacks. No group of agents can merge and increase their joint winning probability without investing
more. A mechanism which is not robust to centralization will, by definition, provide some agents
with incentives to merge as agents with larger investments have a relatively higher winning proba-
bility. This might lead such a selection mechanism to be, in the long-run, controlled by relatively
few agents which in some context (like cryptocurrencies) is non-desirable as it increases the risk of
attacks and manipulation.
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Proposition 1. A random selection mechanism p is anonymous, robust to Sybil attacks, and robust





Proof. We begin by showing the axioms imply the functional form (1) in the case where the invest-
ment of each agent is rational x ∈ Qn+. Consider an arbitrary vector of investments x ∈ Qn+ and
w.l.o.g assume that all investments are expressed with respect to a common denominator b ∈ N,
i.e. there exitst a ∈ Nn such that xi = ai/b. We begin by splitting the first agent into a1 agents
each of which makes an investment of 1/b. As a consequence of the robustness to Sybil attacks
and centralization it follows that the joint winning probability of the first a1 agents after this split



















In the next step we merge the last n−1 agents into a single agent. Again by the robustness to Sybil
attacks and centralization the winning probability of the last agent in the new situation equals the
joint winning probability of the last n− 1 agents in the old situation. As the winning probabilities


















In the next step we split the a + 1 agent into
∑n
i=2 ai agents each investing
1
b . Again, by the















where |a| = ∑ni=1 ai. It follows from anonymity that each of the agents wins with equal probability









To extend this result from Qn+ to Rn+ we first show that the result extends to vectors where the
first coordinate is chosen from R+ instead of Q+. Consider an arbitrary x−1 ∈ Qn−1+ and x1 ∈ R+.
Choose two sequences wr, vr ∈ Q+ such that wr converges to x1 from above and vr converges to












As the lower bound and the upper bound converge to the same limit it follows that pn1 (x) =
x1
|x|
for all x with x1 ∈ R+ and x−1 ∈ Qn−1+ . By anonymity p22(x) = x2|x| for all x with x−2 ∈ Q
n−1
+ and
x2 ∈ R+. Thus, for x−2 ∈ Qn−1+ and x2 ∈ R+ we have that












Applying the above argument with an upper and lower bound again yields that for all x with
(x1, x2) ∈ R2+ and (x3, . . . , xn) ∈ Qn−2+ we have that pn1 (x) = x1|x| . Applying the same argument
sequentially for each agent k ≥ 3 yields that pn1 (x) = x1|x| for all x ∈ Rn+. By permuting the role
of agent 1 and agent i and anonymity we have that pni (x) =
xi∑n
j=1 xj
for all i ∈ {1, .., n} and all
x ∈ Rn+.
We are left to verify that the functional form (1) satisfies our assumptions. Clearly (1) is















= pn1 (x) ,
which shows that the functional form (1) is robust to Sybil attacks and centralization and completes
the proof.
Equation 1 states that the probability with which an agent is selected is proportional to the
share of computations she performed. For example, it describes the probability that a miner is
selected to mine the next block in Bitcoin: Miners attempt to mine the next Bitcoin block once
the previous block was published (we abstract from some technical details and assume blocks are
transmitted instantaneously to all miners) by attempting different values of a nonce and computing
their hashes. Under common cryptographic assumptions, no miner can do better than guess a
random nonce and each nonce entails the same probability of being selected (to mine the next
block). Thus, the probability with which an agent is selected in the Bitcoin protocol equals the
number of hashes she computed relative to the total number of hashes computed before the next
block is mined.
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that the monotonicity of the selection mechanism is not
necessary if one restricts attention to the case where investments are rational numbers. In any
practical application where quantities invested can be finitely encoded the restriction to rational
number is vacuously satisfied and thus the monotonicity assumption plays no role.
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3 Mining in the Bitcoin and other Proof of Work Protocols
This section establishes the link between random selection mechanisms (analyzed in Section 2) and
cryptographic protocols for randomly selecting an agent based upon the computations performed by
each agent, i.e. proof of work (PoW) based protocols. To ease the exposition we sometimes follow
the language commonly used in the context of Bitcoin and refer to agents as “miners”, and being
selected as “mining a block”. Throughout we focus on the economic incentives — cost and benefits
— of mining a block intentionally abstracting away from many computational and cryptographic
details.
Consider a situation where n agents (miners), indexed by i ∈ N , compete to be selected to mine
the next block. Each agent assigns a value of 1 to being selected to mine the next block.2 Denote
by S the set of strategies available to each miner. A strategy si ∈ S describes a complete contingent
plan of what the miner will do until the next block is mined. For example, which computations
miner i will perform and which hardware she will use to perform them and so on. We denote by
γi c(si) ≥ 0
the expected cost miner i incurs when using the strategy si. The cost could be energy cost associated
with the computations performed according to si, but also the cost of renting computational power
from a cloud service such as Amazon AWS. Through the parameter γi > 0 we explicitly allow
the miners to have different costs to account for the fact that they might have access to different
hardware and might face different energy prices.
Consider a family of functions φn : Sn → ∆n such that for each n ∈ N and each vector of
strategies s ∈ Sn the probability with which miner i is selected equals
φni (s1, . . . , sn) .
We assume that there exists a recommended strategy σ : R+ → S that recommends for each budget
of computations x an agent is willing to perform on the next block a strategy that is strictly optimal
independent of the strategies used by other agents, i.e. for all xi ∈ R+, i ∈ N, s−i ∈ Sn−1 and si ∈ S
such that c(si) ≤ xi
φ(σ(x), s−i) > φ(si, s−i) .
Definition 2 (Proof of Work Protocol). We call a tuple (S, c, f, σ) a Proof of Work protocol.
A few properties of the PoW protocol are important for maintaining a reliable decentralized
system. To prevent dependency on other systems, the PoW selection should not rely on an external
source of identity verification. To maintain decentralization, the PoW should allow any potential
2This is without loss of generality as we can rescale the agents cost and benefits by dividing through the value
this agent assigns to mining a block.
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miner to be able to enter and participate in the random selection. In particular, new miners should
be free to join, and small miners or new miners should not be at a disadvantage. These motivate
the following axioms, which are the counterparts of the axioms of Section 2.
As stated above, in a decentralized PoW protocol miners are anonymous and there is no registry
of miners identities. The selection function φ can distinguish between players only through the
results of their computation, which are fully determined by their strategies. Therefore, φ depends
only on the strategies chosen by players and not their identities:
Axiom 4 (Anonymity). A PoW protocol is anonymous if φ is invariant under permutations, i.e.
for every n and every permutation π : Rn+ → Rn+ it satisfies π(φn(x)) = φn(π(x)) .
The lack of identifiable identities also implies that the selection mechanism cannot know whether
multiple players are controlled by a single entity. Allowing any potential participant to join without
authentication allows existing players to participate under many different identities, and potentially
engage in Sybil attacks. We therefore ask that the PoW protocol is robust to Sybil attacks:
Axiom 5 (Robustness to Sybil Attacks). An anonymous PoW protocol is robust to Sybil attacks
if for every s ∈ Sn and every s̃ ∈ Sk with ∑kj=1 c(s̃j) = c(s1)
φn1
(







s̃1, . . . , s̃k, s2, s3, . . . , sn
)
.
The security of the blockchain can be jeopardized when a single miner controls a large fraction
of the computational power in the network. Nakamoto (2008) argues that the Bitcoin is secure as
long as no miners holds more than half of the mining power in the network (a miner with more than
half of the total mining power can reverse transactions). We therefore ask that the PoW protocol
does not create incentives for miner consolidation.
Axiom 6 (Robust to Centralization). An anonymous PoW protocol is robust to centralization if
for every s ∈ Sn and every s̃ ∈ Sk with ∑kj=1 c(s̃j) = c(s1)
φn1
(







s̃1, . . . , s̃k, s2, s3, . . . , sn
)
.
The above axioms describe properties of the PoW protocol. Next, we describe how miners will
behave in such a protocol. An equilibrium of the game played between n miners is a strategy profile
s ∈ Sn such that no miner i can benefit from deviating to another strategy s′i ∈ S
φni (si, s−i)− γi c(si) ≥ φni (s′i, s−i)− γi c(s′i) .
Our main theorem below shows that, maybe surprisingly, our previous axioms are enough to
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uniquely pin down the winning probability of each miner only as a function of the number of
computations each miner performed:
Theorem 1. Consider a PoW protocol that is anonymous, robust to Sybil attacks and centralization




Proof. Fix an anonymous PoW protocol (S, c, f, σ) that is robust to Sybil attacks and centralization.
For every n define pn : Rn+ → ∆n by pn(x) = φ(σ(x1), . . . , σ(x2)). Because a larger xi allows σ(xi)
to select among more strategies, p(x) is non-decreasing in xi and thus p is a selection mechanism
according to Definition 1. This mechanism, it is anonymous as φ is invariant. Furthermore, as the
PoW protocol is robust to Sybil attacks we have that for every x ∈ Rn+ and every y ∈ Rk+ with∑k
j=1 yj = x1
pn1 (x) = φ
n












y1, . . . , yk, x2, x3, . . . , xn
)
.
Thus, the selection mechanism p is robust to Sybil attacks. The same argument establishes that p
is robust to centralization. Thus, by Proposition 1 we have that






Now, consider an equilibrium s ∈ Sn, by the strict optimality of σ it follows that si = σ(c(si)).
Plugging into (2) yields that c(si)∑n
j=1 c(sj)
and completes the proof.
This result carries a few implications. First, our results characterize the random selection
mechanism regardless of the computational tasks and the miners strategy space. This implies that
a different form of competition between miners cannot arise from a different specification of the
computational tasks (for example using a different hash function). Other PoW protocols yield
the same economic competition and computational expenditure. For example, the exactly same
selection mechanism arises in a PoW protocol where the system has access to synchronized clocks
and selects the miner that produces the lowest hash within a prespecified time frame (e.g. every 10
minutes). Our model intentionally abstracted away from many practical frictions that restrict real-
world PoW protocols, such as the lack of access to a synchronized clock, potentially asynchronous
ledgers among the miners, etc. As we derived our impossibility theorem without imposing any
such friction it follows that relaxing any of these practical restrictions through system design or
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cryptographic improvements of the protocol will not lead to a protocol that improves upon Bitcoin
in terms of energy spent on mining.
Second, while it is not surprising that miners will spend more resources in attempt to increases
their chances, the theorem gives a specific function form for the competition between miners. The
winning probability of a miner depends only on his his investment and the aggregate investment.
These determine the equilibrium investment level and the wasteful expenditure on mining. Thus,
reducing this wasteful expenditure in any PoW protocol requires violating one of our axioms.
4 Conclusion
We hope that our results will be helpful in clarifying the trade-offs between PoW systems and
alternative designs. Proof-of-Stake systems violate our anonymity axiom, while maintaining a
weaker version of anonymity. Our anonymity axiom is strong, it requires that all miners are
treated equally regardless of their history within the system. Proof-of-Stake make use of the miner
history within the system (and potentially disadvantages new entrants without a history), violating
our assumptions and thus enabling different random selection mechanisms.
We think that analyzing the set of selection mechanisms that are achievable under weaker
anonymity and robustness requirements is an important question for future research which could
help guide the design of future crypto-currencies. We hope that the formalism we introduced in
this paper will be helpful in this endeavour.
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